This paper concludes that the sustainability of the public "pay-as-you-go" pension regime in Colombia (RPM) looks fragile and is threatened by massive transfers from the private "defined contributions" regime (RAIS) to the RPM. The fiscal deficit of the RPM could be rising from 140% of GDP (in NPV) to 228% of GDP during the next three decades on account of the migration of close to nine million retirees moving to the RPM. Pressure to the fiscal budget will increase towards 90% of GDP (in NPV) as a result of the pension shortfall, making it very difficult to comply with a fiscal target of 4% of GDP per year. In addition, the life annuities' market is quite shallow in Colombia due to: i) the State guarantee of a pension equivalent to 100% of a legal-minimum-wage (1 LMW); which in turn is fully indexed to annual inflation; and ii) the risk of assuming longer periods of pension enjoyment via judicial sentences (elevating the current expectations of 20-25 year period of enjoyment). Limiting the pension guarantee to 50-75% of a LMW, allowing for life-annuities recalculation, and decreasing the cost-margin of insurance companies would help place the Colombian life annuities market in a more financially sustainable path.
some time: Colpensiones' public sector pay-as-you-go scheme regime (RPM, Régimen de Prima Media) is unjust and has been generating increasing pressure on the public budget. In particular, the OECD has recommended withering the RPM, claiming that, even worldwide, there are serious challenges in adjusting this scheme to drastic demographic changes .
In contrast, the advantages of the private sector, a defined contributions regime (RAIS, Régimen de Ahorro Individual) lies in that it doesn't generate fiscal shortfalls, because future pension allowances will match the bulk of contributions and the return on the portfolio, operating under the "magic" spell of compounded interest. Only in the case in which the government must guarantee a minimum pension the system may need to complement resources with additional budgetary contributions.
Let's bring to mind that in Colombia, in order to gain access to a pension under the pay-as-you go RPM, the following requirements must be met (according to Law 797 of 2003): i) having contributed for 1300 weeks (25 years); ii) age of retirement of 57/62 years (men/women). On the other hand, under the RAIS, retirement conditions are given by the contribution amount that each worker has accumulated, where the minimum amount equals one Legal Minimum Wage (LMW).
In the event that the age requirement is met (under the RPM), but not the minimum time of contribution (25 years), savings will be reimbursed and adjusted only by inflation. In case the minimum savings amount is not reached (under the RAIS), these savings will be returned not only adjusted by inflation, but in addition by a return on market real interest rate.
Given the current low density of pension contributions, it is estimated that 80% of active contributors (close to 7.4 million Colombians) will fall short of reaching a pension, which implies that for the majority of contributors the private sector RAIS scheme (under which savings yield a real return) is more convenient than the public sector RPM (under which only inflation is recognized). Notice that if the difference between the reimbursements based on real return vs. inflation were equal to 3% per year in real terms, then the values recognized by the RAIS would surpass those for the RPM in an amount of 40% during two decades or equivalent to 70% in three decades.
Consequently, the 20% that are entitled to receive a pension will encounter the following options. Under the RPM, they will receive a life-long pension, whose value will depend on the accumulated time of contribution, which in turn will depend on the "replacement rate" (pension allowance/average wage). This replacement rate (RR) will fluctuate between 65% and 75% for the vast majority of retirees, following recent adjustments to Law 797 of 2003 (whereas, the global regime hovers around the 45%-50% range). The exception being the case of a minimum pension, which in Colombia equals 100% of the LMW by constitutional mandate, compared to a 75% of LMW in Chile.
Under the public sector regime, the State must assume the actuary risk of "extra-longevity" of retirees (resulting from higher life expectancy beyond the 57/62 years of age for women/men, which applied since 2014), in addition to the legal risk of pension augmentation because of "surviving beneficiaries".
In contrast, under the RAIS there are two alternatives: i) commission a pension fund (AFP) to manage savings under the "programmed retirement" scheme, where the pension allowance will vary according to portfolio performance and the retiree-s expected longevity (nevertheless, the Supreme Court has ruled that these schemes must yield at least the inflation rate, which shows that they have failed to understand the whole point of this scheme); or ii) acquire a "life annuity" with an insurance company, situation for which the insurer must carefully evaluate the trade-off between expected allowance and life-expectancy, return and duration of assets available for investment, as well as the legal risk of pension augmentation because of "surviving beneficiaries" .
In Colombia, the real problem is the fact that pension benefits are generous (LMW pension, 100% allowance in the case of a deceased retiree, etc.), and must be financed using savings that are insufficient. This is the result of characteristics particular to the contributions system (low income, irregular contribution, evasion and elusion, etc.). In consequence, both the market for programmed retirement as well as for life annuities exhibit low levels of penetration. Currently, the RAIS holds close to 81,000 retirees (5% of total), of which only 21,000 are retired because of old age.
Furthermore, there is evidence showing that there is little depth in the life annuities market. This segment accounts for just 13% of old-age retirees (vs. 66% in Chile) even after 20 years of the RAIS, whereas programmed retirement takes up the remaining 87% (vs. 34% in Chile), shows that life annuities are not targeting low-income retirees (close to 70%), which are also the segment of the population that needs coverage to prevent a situation in which savings are insufficient to meet the 1 LMW requirement. On the other hand, even for high-income cases, there is a higher concentration risk for pension funds, who must simultaneously manage core business risks (operational, minimum return, etc.) as well as the risk of savings shortfall (longevity, financial and legal), while optimizing portfolios and recalculating allowances (which must readjust to recognize inflation according to the aforementioned Constitutional Court (CC) ruling).
To this date, the lackluster performance of the life annuities scheme in Colombia is mainly due to the "risk of a sliding LMW". This risk results from the fact that close to 70% of pensions are close to the LMW and must be adjusted to inflation (by constitutional mandate). Furthermore, the annual adjustment of the LMW has experienced a "political" premium by which the "universal rule" has been surpassed, whereby Var. % LMW > inflation +/-Var. % labor productivity. On average, 1 LMW retirees have benefited from a "premium" worth 0.4% per year during the last decade, leading to an extra cost for insurance companies.
More recently, the government has been moving in the right direction by establishing coverage mechanisms that will enable insurance companies to cover this risk of a sliding LMW, as captured by Decree 36 of 2015. This decree states that the government should assume the shortfall in pension resources resulting from LMW adjustments that exceed inflation plus gains in labor productivity (taking into account the past 10-year average). In contrast, when reserves exceed the actuary value of future obligations, insurance companies should pay the government the mathematical reserve surplus.
In terms of the pension shortfall that the RAIS must entail, drafted regulation sets new capital requirements specific to programmed retirement. Capital must be sufficient to ensure the issuance of a life annuity in the same amount. In addition, a margin is being introduced by which a life annuity will be mandatory, equivalent to 1.1 of the amount required for a 1 LMW pension.
Even though these regulatory developments should help promote life annuities, there is still much work to be done in terms of adjusting the group of substitute beneficiaries, as has been pointed out by Fasecolda (the Colombian Insurance Lobby's Organization). This group definition was enlarged by Law 797 of 2003, and now includes disabled siblings (that area economically dependent to the retiree) and permanent companions (not oust spouses) as beneficiaries of the surviving pension. This last point is particular damaging because, by allowing simultaneous beneficiaries (previous spouse and current companion), the actuary calculation takes into account two lives-span. Furthermore, the CC has made the burden on beneficiaries more taxing: i) Sentence C-1176 of 2001 declared the requirement of "recognizing marital status from the moment in which requirements to obtain pension right" as unconstitutional; ii) Sentence C-111 of 2006, which states that parents may be beneficiaries in the case where the retiree's income is relevant to them; and iii) Sentence C-336 of 2008, which recognizes a surviving pension of same-sex couples.
The idea is that the sum of all these factors should be "predictable" when calculating pension insurance under a life annuity scheme. This would allow insurance companies to recalculate pension allowances and make them financially viable, as is the case in Chile . In this way, the challenge in Colombia is that of making the RAIS scheme sustainable during the de-accumulation phase by a recalculation of pension allowance. This requires addressing the thorny judicial issue of unexpected past beneficiaries appearing in life annuity contracts (with a further complication: the impossibility of reducing a life annuity beyond 1 LMW).
Another issue is the fact that the pension system not only covers through insurance policies the risk of old-age, but also that of disability and survival. These risks are transferred by each pension fund to an insurance company in exchange for a premium, which must be calculated as a fraction of an overall 3% contribution fee (the remaining portion is the fee that the pension fund receives).
Method
This paper addresses these pension system challenges, both for the accumulation and de-accumulation stages. The first set of estimations aim at determining the Net Present Value (NPV) of the pension system, from the RAIS-RPM migration phenomenon, which has been spurred by the "unfair" competition that Law 100 de 1993 enabled by facing RAIS private-savings to RPM government subsidies. The second set of results reviews the de-accumulation of pension savings under the scope of life annuities. In particular, we will focus on pension shortfall and the value of life annuity premium, which helps explain the lack of depth within the life annuity market in Colombia.
Pension Migration Model (from RAIS to RPM)
The risk of fiscal unsustainability for the public sector pay-as-you-go regime (RPM) are becoming clearer with Figure 4 . Therefore, the composition of active contributors RAIS/RPM would change slightly from 77%/23% at the end of 2014 to 64%/36% by 2050 (-8%/+8% against the base scenario), see Figure 5 and 6.
To these estimations, we must now add the pension-NPV resulting from additional transfers derived from our semi-elasticity interest rate model. To this respect, we will plug different transfer scenarios into the wage distribution of active contributors in Colombia. We will assume four types of representative agents according to wage range: agent A (contributing on 1 LMW, represents 58% of PILA-contributors), agent B (2 LMW, 24% of PILA-contributors), agent C (5 LMW, 14%) and agent D (10 LMW, 4%).
Base Scenario (25 years of contribution and enjoyment; real return of 7.2%)
Actuary results for the base case are analyzed by looking at following variables: i) total savings or accumulated pension contributions that each worker pays throughout his/her work lifespan; ii) NPV of the subsidy or the difference between the "actual value" of pension payments offered by RPM and potential payouts that workers could receive by cashing-out savings under the market model (RAIS); iii) NPV of the pension or the "actual value" of pension payouts received under RPM; iv) the replacement rate or Benefits/Contributions ratio; and v) replacement rate or benefits/contribution ratio. We have used as a starting point pension contributions equivalent to 11.5% of monthly wage, with 100% density and calculated immediately prior to time of retirement.
Using 2015 prices, agent A earning 1 LMW, manages to save close to $32 million during the working lifespan, assuming a 7.2% annual real return rate on contributions balance. Nevertheless, he receives a pension (in NPV, with a 6% discount rate) of $102 million because his minimum pension must be at least equivalent to 1 LMW. Therefore, the NPV of the subsidy should be close to $70 million (pesos of 2015), equivalent to 69% in terms of the subsidy/pension ratio, see Table 3 . Similarly, individual B could save more than agent A, given the fact that he earns a higher wage (2 LMW). In this case, the pension offered by the government is calculated against 65% of his 10-year average wage, according to the replacement rate formula given by Law 797 of 2003 (detailed previously). Therefore, this individual manages to save close to $64 million (pesos of 2015) during his working lifespan. Nevertheless, because he receives a pension worth $114 million he receives a 44% subsidy. Agent C (5 LMW) manages to save close to $160 million and receives a pension worth $277 million (a $118 million subsidy; 42% of his pension). Finally, agent D (10 LMW) receives a $213 million subsidy (40% of his pension).
Notice how these implicit subsidies tend to be less (in relative terms) for higher wages, and are highly regressive in absolute terms. For example, agent D (10 LMW) will receive a subsidy worth $213 million, three times as much the $70 million perceived by agent A (contributing with 1 LMW).
In terms of the replacement rate, agent A (1 LMW) will receive a pension worth 100% of his salary (1 LMW), compared to 31% (effective) that he would otherwise receive from depleting his savings under a market regime (see Table 4 ). This implies that his savings will cover 13 allowances/year worth 31% of 1-LMW during 25 years. Hence, agent A receives a subsidy (measured in terms of replacement rate) of 69bps. Agent B receives a subsidy of 28 bps, agent C 27bps, and agent D 24bps. 
Life An
By using a would be c this premiu in which obtain a w Let us recall that an individual that contributes on 1 LMW would save close to $32 million throughout his working lifespan (taking into account 25 years of contribution and a 7.2% real return rate on AFP's. Under current regulation, once this individual reaches the de-accumulation stage of his pension cycle, he must acquire a life annuity of at least 1 LMW, in order to guarantee a minimum pension, as given by the Constitutional mandate. Nevertheless, these results shows how this individual will withstand a shortfall worth $138 million (= $170 cost of premium -$32 savings), equivalent to 81% of the total value of the premium.
For an individual that contributes on 2 LMW, his savings would amount to $64 million by the end of his working life. Nevertheless, because the market can only fund a replacement rate between 45%-50% (not 100% or even the 65% set by Law 797 of 2003), this will determine the allowance (given by the annuity) the individual will obtain. Hence, considering that this allowance (indexed to inflation) cannot fall below the 1-LMW mark (inflation + labor productivity), we must consider a replacement rate of 85% (1.7 LMW), in order to secure that these conditions are met (pension must be worth at least 1 LMW during the entire life of the pension). With this in mind, each individual that contributes on 2 LMW, would face a shortfall worth $196 million (= $260 cost of premium -$64 savings), equivalent to 75% of the total value of the premium, see Table 6 . Clearly, our estimations give evidence of just how insufficient market parameters are in achieving a match between savings-premium, given current regulatory and demographic-legal conditions.
Discussion
Throughout this paper, we have analyzed the problems surrounding the Colombian pension system, both for the savings stage as well as the de-accumulation phase. Our findings encompass several fronts: i) the effect that a RAIS-RPM migration has on the estimated NPV for the pension system, including additional transfers that would result under a scenario of lower rates of return; and ii) by estimating the shortfall in the life annuities' market.
In what concerns the number of transfers from RAIS-RPM, the key element within our model lies from calculating semi-elasticities of current contributors against historical return rates for pension funds (AFPs). By estimating these parameters, we find a +5.5% semi-elasticity between current RAIS contributors and the interest rate. This captures just how attractive it is for RAIS contributors to stay put in presence of higher market returns.
On the other hand, we find a -4.3% semi-elasticity for current RPM contributors. This result is consistent with the fact that there are greater incentives to migrate from RAIS to RPM when facing lower yields.
Our more estimations show that the pension NPV in Colombia is worth 141.3% of GDP, including adjustments for updated mortality tables. This gross NPV is made up of a subsidy component (83.6% of GDP) and pension contributions (57.7% of GDP). Nonetheless, in order for the government to cover the entire value of this gross NPV it must make use of the "uncovered PGN", because it has already consumed these contributions and has depleted RPM reserves since 2003. Furthermore, by aggregating this additional actuary cost of assuming larger RAIS-RPM transfers, the gross NPV rises to 228% of GDP (129.5% from the subsidy component and 98.6% from contributions).
The pension system currently has a shortfall because of RPM migration, and this seriously affects the government's goal of reducing resources it sets apart for this objective, which are worth 4% of GDP per year (close to 20% of the total budget).
Regarding the life annuities' market, we estimate value of the premium that an insurance company should charge on a life annuity by employing a cash-flow model. This estimation assumes that the key parameter is the amount of time of enjoyment of the annuity, considering potential beneficiaries as well as legal contingencies, considering the potential beneficiaries as well as legal contingencies.
Our estimations suggest that the premium on a life annuity that guarantees 1-LMW would be close to $146 jms.ccsenet.org
Journal of Management and Sustainability Vol. 7, No. 1; 2017 million (pesos of 2015), accounting for 20 years of enjoyment. Notice how the price for this premium will increase throughout the period of enjoyment, reaching a premium of $279 million for the case in which enjoyment lasts 50 years. Therefore, by considering the distribution probability of enjoyment, we obtain a weighted average of 25 years, consistent with a premium worth $170 million.
An individual that contributes on 1 LMW would save close to $32 million throughout his working lifespan. Under current regulation, once this individual reaches the de-accumulation stage of his pension cycle, he must acquire a life annuity of at least 1 LMW, in order to guarantee a minimum pension, as given by the Constitutional mandate. Nevertheless, this individual will withstand a shortfall worth $138 million (= $170 cost of premium -$32 savings), equivalent to 81% of the total value of the premium.
Clearly, our estimations give evidence of just how insufficient market parameters are in achieving a match between savings-premium, given current regulatory and demographic-legal conditions.
